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THE LOGICAL DIFFICULTIES OF LET'S-PRETEND
TAX LAW
DANIEL CANDEE KNICKERBOCKER,

JR.t

L ONG

BEFORE Chief Justice Rolle invented the fictitious lessee
and the casual ejector in aid of claimants to land,1 lawyers had
learned to escape the embarrassment of the real world by way of makebelieve. Innumerable problems were solved by treating things as what
they were not. The practice continues. Today's lawyer is no less adept
than his professional ancestors in the creation of convenient fictions.
One can scarcely condemn a usage so ancient and so demonstrably
effective. But these little inventions carry their own perils with them.
We should never forget what they really are; we should remind ourselves frequently that, for all their utility, they remain figments. As
such, they are fragile craft. Designed to bear single and specific cargoes,
they are likely to founder if asked to carry more.
It is the purpose of this article to consider the present-day use of
legal fictions and the consequence of using them too enthusiastically.
The illustrations are an almost random selection of recent cases and
rulings in a single field, that of the federal tax law. Nevertheless, the
problems described have their counterparts in all other areas of practice.
Perhaps it will serve our purpose here if we begin with a brief
enumeration of some of the recent decisions in which let's-pretend has
played a part. Consider, if you will, the following hodgepodge:
Case 1. A taxpayer who had elected to have his sole proprietorship taxed as a corporation was found to have realized, and
was accordingly taxed on, a capital gain from the imaginary liquidation of his "pseudocorporation" when he transferred all of its
assets to a real corporation.'
t A.B., 1940, Syracuse University; LL.B., 1950, Cornell Law School; Tax Counsel, John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company.
1. 3 BLACKSTrONZ, COMMZNTARIzS* 202-03.
2. Estate of David Wein, 40 T.C. 454 (1963). The election referred to was one
pursuant to INT. R V. CODS OF 1954 § 1361, which is available only to those proprietor-

ships and partnerships for which capital is a material income-producing factor and
at least half of whose gross income derives from trading in or the brokerage of
real property, securities or commodities. It does not confer complete corporate tax
status and should not be confused with the involuntary corporate characterization
accorded some unincorporated organizations by virtue of the definition in § 7701 (a) (3)
of the Code. Section 1361 was part of an overall design to "permit . . . business to
select the form of organization . . . most suitable to its operation without being influenced by Federal income-tax considerations." S. Rl4p. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
119 (1954). The design was somewhat distorted by the unexplained Conference rejection of a corresponding election by corporations to be treated as partnerships.

(3)
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Case 2. An elderly widow who had never been gainfully
employed was found to be prevented from engaging in her customary substantial gainful activity and thus qualified for the
expanded medical expense deduction provided in Code section
21 3 (g). 8
Case 3. A state income tax imposed upon a gain which was
not and never could be taxed under the federal statute was held
allowable as a deduction in spite of the prohibition of Code section
265 on deductions for expenses "allocable to . . . income . . .
wholly exempt from" federal tax because the provision under
which the gain escaped federal tax was one calling for the nonrecognition of such gain and not its exclusion from gross income.4
Case 4. A loan of 100,000 dollars made to a corporation by
a man who was not otherwise a stockholder was held for tax
purposes to be an investment in stock so that (a) interest on the
loan was not deductible and (b) interest on later advances nearly
two-and-a-half times as great made by the same man was deductible.5
Case 5. An interest in a tavern was held to be property of
the same kind or class as an interest in a home and auto supply
business so as to permit the exchange of the former for the latter
without recognition of gain."
Case 6. Federal income taxes assessed and paid in 1956 in
respect of the income of a cash basis corporation for the years
1949 through 1955 were treated as if they had actually been paid
in those earlier years and had therefore reduced earnings and
profits sufficiently to make part of the distributions to shareholders
in such years nontaxable returns of capital rather than dividends."
We may contrast with the above holdings the following rejections
of fiction:
Case 7. The passage of an estate by reason of intestacy to
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania was held not to be a "transfer
...to or for the use of ... [a] State ' 8 and thus not to give rise
to a charitable deduction for federal estate tax purposes. 9
H.R. REP. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 72 (1954). Subchapter S (INT. Rev. CoDe
ov 1954 §§ 1371-77), added by the Technical Amendments Act of 1958, ch. 866, § 64,
72 Stat. 1650 (1958), now provides an election of the latter sort.
3. Rev. Rul. 63-101, 1963 INT. Rev. BULL. No. 22, at 11.
4. Commissioner v. McDonald, 12 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 5162 (5th Cir. 1963),
affirming 36 T.C. 1108 (1961).
5. The Motel Co., 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 825 (1963).
6. Miller v. United States, 12 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 5244 (S.D. Ind. 1963).
7. Demmon v. United States, 12 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 5371 (7th Cir. 1963).
8. INT. Rxv. CoD4 Ol 1954 § 2055c(1).
9. Senft v. United States, CCH EsT. & GIrT TAX RYP. (437-18 U. S. Tax Cas.)

12, 158 (3d Cir. June 29, 1963), affirming 202 F. Supp. 838 (M.D. Pa. 1962).
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Case 8. A father entitled under state law to his sons' earnings could not claim dependency deductions for children supported
by him in large part with such earnings.1"
Case 9. A change from corporation to partnership tax treatment accorded an unincorporated association, which change arose
solely by reason of a revision in Treasury regulations, was held
not to have constituted a liquidation of the organization or a
taxable distribution to its associates.11
Case 10. An estate whose income was payable to charitable
beneficiaries could not be allowed a charitable deduction for an
amount included in its income where such amount represented a
consent dividend deemed to have been, but not actually received,
12
from a personal holding company.
Case 11. A couple domiciled in a community property state
were not entitled to treat earnings of the husband during a period
of foreign residence as having been earned half by him and half
by the wife in order to exempt 40,000 dollars rather than 20,000
dollars of the income from United States tax."
In considering these decisions and rulings, we are not concerned
with their soundness as expositions of the law, nor with whether they
may be relied on as precedents. We are not even, in this context, interested in discovering what they tell us of the need for law reform. Rather
our interest in them is for what they disclose with respect to the administrative and judicial process.
It is submitted that our test cases are notable chiefly for a sense
of overriding equity. In spite of their citations of authority and air of
formal logic, these determinations suggest a greater concern for people
than for principles. Fictions are invoked in order to defeat smart tax
avoidance schemes or to give comfort to those whose positions are
personally appealing; fact is rigidly adhered to if it will provide escape
from a dilemma that is not of the taxpayer's own making.
This approach, for example, explains the seemingly tortuous logic
of the gain that arose when the imaginary corporation became a real
one. To be sure, the result was in accord with Treasury regulations 4
and was doubtless a permissible inference from the statute. But the
problem was presented by a taxpayer who had made his election of
10. Dick v. United States, 11 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 1651 (E.D. Wis. 1963).
11. Rev. Rul. 63-107, 1963 INT. Rlv. BuLL. No. 23, at 10.
12. Estate of Joseph R. Esposito, 40 T.C. 459 (1963).

13. Renoir v. Commissioner, 12 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 5402 (9th Cir. 1963),
affirming 37 T.C. 1180 (1961).
14. Treas. Reg. § 1.1361-5(b) (1960). It should be noted that this regulation
was not proposed until four years after the taxpayer in the Wein case had made his
§ 1361 election and his subsequent transfer of assets to a real corporation. 24 Fed.
Reg, 2681 (1959).
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pseudocorporate status on February 25th and had transferred his business to a real corporation on April 1st. The February election was a
method-and the only one then possible--of insulating the earnings of
the business for the prior calendar year from tax at the rate applicable
to individuals. The subsequent actual incorporation suggests that the
election was an attempt to incorporate nunc pro tunc. And this is what
it would have been if the formation of the real corporation had not
triggered a liquidation of its fictitious predecessor. In the words of
Judge Forrester:
Presumably the individual rates would have been higher [than
the corporate], else the 1361 (a) election would never have been
made. Petitioner ... would have us ignore this fact ... and treat
the exchange as . . . a tax-deferred corporate organization under

section 351.
* * . [T]he net earnings of the pseudocorporation . . . for
Federal income tax purposes . . . belonged to the pseudocorporation. David Wein could have gotten them . . . by a distribution

under section 1361(k), but then they would have been taxed to
him at ordinary rates as a dividend. Respondent seeks less by
his assertion of the principles of a liquidating distribution ....
The desire to strike down the merely clever seems likewise to have
informed the court's view of the father who claimed dependency deductions on the strength of his children's earnings. The layman may find
the mere fact that such an argument could have been made a little
startling. But once one accepts the basic premise imposed by local law
that what the child earns belongs to his parent, the taxpayer's position
begins to look plausible. Indeed strict logic might require an acceptance
of the argument coupled, however, with a holding that the earnings
used by the taxpayer in discharging his support obligations were includible in his income. This, however, seems precluded by the statutory
provision making children's earnings their income and not that of their
parents (even though they are not "received" by the children) and
expenditures therefrom expenditures by the children.16 Conceivably,
one might argue that the provision is directed only to the income tax
treatment of children's earnings where the only ground for taxing them
to the parent is a state law similar to that invoked in the Dick1 7 case.
On this theory the parent who not only had a legal right to his son's
15. Estate of David Wein, 40 T.C. 454, 457-58 (1963).
16. INT. Riv. CoDm or 1954 § 73. This provision was added to the tax law by
Individual Income Tax Act of 1944, ch. 210, § 7, 58 Stat. 235 (1944), adding a new
subsection (m) to Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 22.
17. Dick v. United States, 11 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 1651 (E.D. Wis. 1963).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol9/iss1/2

4

FALL

1963]

Knickerbocker: The Logical Difficulties of Let's-Pretend Tax Law
LET'S-PRETEND TAX LAW

wages, but actually used them to meet his own obligations would be
18
required to include them (to the extent of such use) in his own income.
9
In Esposito the claim that an imaginary receipt could have been
paid to a charity and thus given rise to a perfectly genuine deduction
was not as far-fetched as it seems and as the court found it. The court
in its opinion relied heavily on the fact that the Executors' account filed
with the New York County Surrogate showed no income of the personal holding company as having been either received or distributed. 0
But the absence of these items should not have been dispositive of the
issue. There are many differences between income for fiduciary ac21
counting purposes and income in the contemplation of the tax law.
If the amount of the consent dividend was included in any item accounted for as principal (for example, the stock of the corporation or
the proceeds of its liquidation) and, if such item was permanently set
aside for or paid to the charitable legatees, it should have been allowed
as a deduction under Code section 642(c). In its distaste for what
seemed a barefaced quibble, the court may have overlooked an underlying reality.
The rejection of M. and Mine. Renoir's ingenious argument in
support of increasing the exempt portion of their foreign income suggests more an impatience with all arguments resting on the community
22
property concept than any special scorn for this one.
18. An argument very like that offered by Mr. Dick was similarly rejected in
James R. Dunning, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 648 (1963). In that case a father who
was required by a divorce decree to pay $15 a week for the support of his minor son
took the position that this entitled him to a dependency deduction because state law
made a father solely responsible for the support of his children. The court held that
in the absence of proof that he had actually provided more than half his son's support
the taxpayer could not avail himself of the deduction. These eminently reasonable
decisions should be compared with the holding in Charles P. Ide, 40 T.C. 721 (1963).
In 1958 the taxpayers had provided between $1,500 and $2,000 for the support of
their son, a student at Cornell. As a member of the Naval R.O.T.C., the son
during the same year had received from the Navy (and admittedly used in supporting himself) a little over $900. In addition, the Navy had paid out $1,500 to
cover the cost of his tuition and books at the University. The court found this last
amount represented a scholarship which was expressly removed from the support
equation by INT. Rv. CODE OP 1954 § 151 (e) (4). Accordingly, taxpayers' claimed
dependency deduction was sustained.
19. Estate of Joseph R. Esposito, 40 T.C. 459 (1963).
20. Id. at 460.
21. The most obvious area of difference is in the treatment of capital gains which,
although part of taxable income, are almost always principal for fiduciary accounting
purposes. See Treas. Reg. § 1.66 2 (c)-4 (1956) which, by way of example, shows the
differences between tax and fiduciary accounting, and the definition of "income" in
the INr. Rtv. CODE O 1954 § 643(b), from which we may infer a statutory recognition
of these differences.
22. Local rules of property have always made for difficulty in the federal tax law,
and of these the community property concept has perhaps occasioned the greatest
difficulty of all. The Supreme Court's declaration that "State law may control only
when the operation of the Federal taxing act, by express language or necessary implication, makes its operation dependent upon State law" [Burnet v. Harmel, 287
U.S. 103, 110, 53 S.Ct. 74, 77 (1932)], is not altogether dispositive of the issue.
Other recent decisions in which community property has created difficulty include
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Disallowing an estate tax deduction for the late Mr. Senft's unintended gift to his state of residence may have seemed the more reasonable because no one in particular was going to bear the burden of
the federal exaction. However one might regard the matter in the abstract, the fact was that Pennsylvania was ahead no matter what it got
2
from this estate. 1

The case of the little old lady who was allowed to deduct all of her
medical expenses appeals to the heart. We can picture her, propped up
in her hospital bed, wan and worn and patiently suffering. Even a tax
collector must do what he can to help such a one as this. 4
The partnership that used to be and no longer is a corporation for
tax purposes is aided because-and only because, as the ruling is careful
to say-its change in character was forced upon it by the tax authorities themselves. Its form of organization, its method of doing business
remains the same. But for 1961 and later years these had a different
meaning from what they had had before. To make this shift in meaning
a taxable event would seem a shocking injustice.
To a degree, the same desire to avoid penalizing the innocent seems
inherent in the curious treatment of earnings and profits in the Demi on25 case. The "corporation" was in fact organized as a trust and had
been filing fiduciary returns. It took the Tax Court and the Sixth Circuit 26 to make certain of the existence of a corporation in contemplation

of the tax law. Moreover, the taxpayers were honest. One of the most
revealing parts of the opinion of Judge Grant is his contrast between
Estate of Lillian B. Gregory, 39 T.C. 1012 (1963), and Rev. Rul. 62-115, 1962-2
CuM. BuLL. 23. Much special tax learning made necessary by the community property rules became obsolete with the enactment of the income splitting and marital
deducton provisions of the Revenue Act of 1948. Int. Rev. Code of 1939 §§ 12, 812,
1004(a), as amended, 62 Stat. 114, 117, 125 (1948) (now INT. Rtv. CODZ or 1954
§§ 2, 2056, 2523).
23. The problem was rather more difficult in Cox v. Commissioner, 297 F. 2d 36
(2d Cir. 1961), affirming 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1470 (1960). There decedent had
willed a portion of her residuary estate to her son, a Jesuit priest, knowing that he
could not acquire property except for his Order and that her bequest therefore had the
effect of a gift to the Society of Jesus. The courts nevertheless held that this knowledge was not sufficient to make the bequest one "to or for the use of" a charity.
24. The problem here is that of reconciling the statutory equivalence of a disability that gives rise to the tax benefit to inability "to engage in any substantial
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable ... impairment," even though
it seems patent that Congress did not intend to confine the benefit to those prevented
from earning a living. In point of fact, the regulations had laid the foundation for
the most recent ruling by stating that in the contemplation of § 213 (g) "housekeeping
shall be considered the substantial gainful activity of an individual whose primary
activity is housekeeping." Treas. Reg. § 1.213-2(c) (1) (1960). Suppose, however, the
case of a very rich woman whose housekeeping has consisted of enjoying the ministrations of a large staff of servants, or that of a spinster who has always lived in a
hotel and whose housekeeping never amounted to more than occasional moves to other
hotels.
25. Demmon v. United States, 12 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 5371 (7th Cir. 1963).
26. Estate of Levi T. Scofield, 25 T.C. 774 (1956), aft'd, 266 F. 2d 154 (6th Cir.
1959).
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this and two earlier cases where "the taxpayers were embezzlers and
black market operators who knew they were diverting corporate funds
and who knew they were evading 95 %o wartime excess profits tax" and
even so were "allowed to accrue ...

unpaid deficiencies, in determining

how much of their illegal gains constituted taxable dividends." 21 The
present plaintiffs on the other hand were guilty of no wrongful intent.
"Reason and authority, '2 8 as Judge Grant insisted, doubtless supported
the plaintiffs' claims for refund. But may we not surmise that those
claims derived additional strength because they seemed some slight
compensation for the pain the plaintiffs had suffered when they saw
their trust relieved of 420,000 dollars in unexpected corporate taxes?
The case of the non-stockholder debts seems at the outset to have
less of an ad hominem flavor than these other decisions. It flows into
the channel of a tolerably ancient authority and swells it in apparent
concord.2" Upon closer inspection, however, we find the decision rather
less than an objective ruling derived from unequivocal facts.
The thin incorporation doctrine is a special application of the
principle that the substance of a transaction and not its form will determine its tax effects. It requires that if any part of a corporation's debt
capital is in substance stock, it will be treated as stock for tax purposes.
In consequence, interest on it will not be allowed as a deduction; its
repayment will constitute a distribution subject to the provisions of
Code subchapter C and, if it becomes uncollectible, its holder will have
suffered a worthless security loss and not a bad debt. There is more
than a hint in the case law that these unhappy results are penalties
imposed upon investors who have failed to supply their corporations
with enough equity capital to make them go. To the extent that they
are rooted in this quantitative concept the decisions lie philosophically
in the same tradition as Deep Rock. 0
A more rewarding analysis will take us beneath the figures and
into the operation of the business. If we discover that the use to which
capital is being put is one for which debt financing is appropriate, it
should not matter that a larger stock issue would have made the debt
unnecessary or even that, in comparison with the amount of debt, the
stock interest is relatively nominal. On the other hand, when capital is
27. Demmon v. United States, 12 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 5371, 5373 (7th Cir. 1963).
28. Ibid.
29. The beginnings of the underlying doctrine are traced in Schlesinger, "Thin"
Incorporations: Income Tax Advantages and Pitfalls, 61 HARV. L. Rev. 50 (1947).
An outline of the case law appears in 2 P-H 1963 F4D. TAX SERV. 1 13096.
30. Taylor v. Standard Gas. Co., 306 U. S. 307, 59 S. Ct. 543 (1939), holding
that, in a reorganization under § 77B of the Bankruptcy Act, [ch. 204 § 77(b), 47
Stat. 1467 (1933)] preferred stockholders of a subsidiary corporation could not be
subordinated to the creditor position of the corporation's parent where it appeared
that the subsidiary had been insufficiently capitalized.
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used in a manner that makes its recovery entirely dependent on the
success of the enterprise, that capital is equity and should be treated as
such for tax purposes. Here again both the size of the stock issue and
its relationship to the size of the debt are irrelevant.
Judged in these terms, the debts in The Motel Co.81 were, it is
believed, properly characterized, the earlier as stock, the later as true
debt. But these were not the terms of the court's view. Once more the
examination was subjective, the test, the parties' deserving natures.
The close relationship between the creditor and the corporation's president and principal stockholder, even more, the great disparity between
the aggregates of debt and equity capital: these were the facts stressed
in support of Judge Pierce's conclusion with respect to the initial debt.
And to buttress his opinion that the later advance was true debt, the
Judge pointed to the conservative debt-stock ratio that then obtained, a,
ratio made all the more conservative by the court's decision on the
status of the initial debt.
The weakness in such an attack on a tax problem is not its mechanistic character or even its air of vindictiveness. Indeed, if this is the
sort of thing tax lawyers may expect, their duty to anticipate adverse
results and avoid them through appropriate action is probably considerably simplified. But taxes are not the only problem with which business must deal, and it should be possible to find the solutions for nontax problems without more than passing reference to tax consequences.
If, in the instant case, it had been sound financial practice to capitalize
the corporation with twenty-five times more debt than stock, no purely
tax rule should make it unsound. But the latter effect is precisely what
results when we set ourselves to reviewing a taxpayer's conduct in
moral terms.
The element of human appeal is obscured in the formal enumeration of facts judicially found. Nevertheless, one may infer that the
unexpressed determinant that made Mr. Norman Miller's tavern partnership the same thing as his new interest in an auto supply business
was the fact that the trade was just a cozy family arrangement. Norman and his two brothers, Donald and Robert, were partners in the
supply store; Norman and Robert ran the tavern. It was agreed-we
are not told why-that Robert would leave the former and Norman
the latter. They made their trade, and Robert became sole owner of the
tavern while Norman took over Robert's interest in the supply store,
becoming the owner of half of it. No cash changed hands. Whether
there had been a change in their respective economic worths or whether
in a technical sense either brother had realized gain or loss, it can hardly
31. The Motel Co., 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 825 (1963).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol9/iss1/2

8

FALL

1963]

Knickerbocker: The Logical Difficulties of Let's-Pretend Tax Law
LET'S-PRETEND TAX LAW

be supposed that either of them considered himself richer or poorer by
reason of the transaction. From their point of view, therefore, the tax
assessed against Norman must have seemed a wholly unreasonable
exaction.
It is possible, of course, that Norman's position in both businesses
was merely that of an investor. In this event there would have been the
sort of equivalence between the partnership interests which permits
nonrecognition of gain upon an exchange. As the regulations point
out, two otherwise qualified properties will be regarded as being of
"like kind" if they have the same nature or character.32 There is doubtless a considerable difference between one partnership interest that sets
one to drawing beer and mixing martinis and another that requires a
knowledge of tires, batteries and spark plugs. The taxpayer who seldom sees the inside of either establishment and is concerned only with
his share of the profits may very well regard the two-and expect the
courts to regard them-as one and the same thing.
We come finally to the Fifth Circuit's decision in Commissioner
v. McDonald38 Taxpayer was the transferee of a corporation which
had adopted a plan of complete liquidation, sold its principal property,
distributed all of its assets to its stockholders, and dissolved. The corporation's gain on the property sale (amounting to nearly 600,000
dollars) was not recognized (by reason of Code section 337) for federal income tax purposes, but it was subject to Louisiana state income
tax., In computing its federal taxable income for its final year of operation, the corporation accrued and deducted this state levy. The Commissioner disallowed the deduction on the ground that the tax represented an expense allocable to income wholly exempt from federal income
tax and was, as such, subject to the proscription of Code section 265 (1 ).
The Tax Court reversed this determination,3 4 and the instant decision
constitutes the Fifth Circuit's affirmance of that action.
The Commissioner's view of this case, and of several others that
arose about the same time, 5 seems in essence to be this: that there is no
difference in substance between those realizations which the statute
32. Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-i (1956). Another recent case applying these rules
is Coastal Terminals Inc. v. United States, 12 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 5247 (4th Cir.,
1963), affirming 207 F. Supp. 560 (E.D.S.D. 1962).
33. Commissioner v. McDonald, 12 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 5162 (5th Cir. 1963),
affirming 36 T.C. 1108 (1961).
34. Commissioner v. McDonald, 36 T.C. 1108 (1961).
35. Commissioner v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 11 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 1614
(4th Cir. 1963), affirming 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 992 (1962); Hawaiian Trust Co.
v. United States, 291 F. 2d 761 (9th Cir. 1961), reversing 178 F. Supp. 637 (D.
Hawaii 1959) ; Rushton v. Patterson, 12 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 5443 (N.D. Ala. 1963) ;
City Bank of Washington, 38 T.C. 713 (1962) ; Cotton States Fertilizer Co., 28 T.C.
1169 (1959). The Service now has announced its concession of defeat in these cases
and will no longer litigate the issue, Rev. Rul. 60-236, 1960-2. Cum. BuLL. 109 will
be "revised." Tech. Inf. Rel. No. 510 (Sept. 25, 1963).
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decrees "shall not be included in gross income""6 and at least some of
those which shall not be "recognized." And this is a position that in
logic is difficult to challenge. The usual distinction between these two
escapes from tax incidence is that between the accretion to wealth which
will never be taxable and the one on which we have chosen to defer tax
until the happening of some future event. The classic example of the
latter is the exchange of properties or securities that takes place in a
corporate reorganization. The stockholder of Company A who turns
in his A shares and gets back shares of B into which A has been merged
realizes, in the contemplation of the tax law, just as much gain or loss
as he would if he had sold his A stock for cash. But Congress has
deemed it inappropriate to tax the gain or allow a loss deduction at this
point.17 Instead, the basis for the A stock is transferred to the B and
the tax or deduction will arise when, if ever, the B is disposed of in a
taxable transaction.8" In this context, the distinction between nonrecognition of gain and its exclusion from gross income is a meaningful
difference. But what if there can be no future taxable disposition? A
corporation buys shares of its own stock in the open market and later
sells them for more than they cost. The statute says this sale is a
transaction in which no gain or loss shall be recognized. 9 Nevertheless,
this involves no tax deferral. The corporation takes cash for the shares
and spends it and that is the end of the tax road. No finespun theory
can hide the economic reality that makes the income here realized wholly
exempt from federal income tax.
The unrecognized gain of the McDonald case was of a similar
nature. Once the corporate property had been sold and the proceeds
distributed to shareholders, the 600,000 dollar gain appeared to evaporate. To be sure, there would be taxes payable in respect of the shareholders' own gains. But these gains were measured upon bases wholly

different from that of the corporation for its property and bore no
necessary relationship to the corporation's own gain.
How then can we explain the Tax Court's and Fifth Circuit's
refusal to accept the Commissioner's reasoning? We may be able to
find our answer in history. For years, perhaps ever since the adoption

of the Sixteenth Amendment, no issue has generated more heat than
the controversy over "double taxation" at corporate and shareholder
36. Hawaiian Trust Co. v. United States, 291 F. 2d 761, 772 (9th Cir. 1961).
37. INT. REv. CODE oV 1954 § 354.

38.
39.

INT.

REv.

CODE

INT. REv. CODE

OP 1954 § 358.
oV 1954 § 1032. An interesting problem arising as a result of

this non-recognition of a gain was considered in Rev. Rut. 62-217, 1962-2 CuM. BULL.
59, which held that a corporation that paid part of the compensation of its employees
in shares of its own stock was entitled, in the year of payment, to a deduction measured by the fair market value of such stock.
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levels.4 ° And to those who fairly quiver in rage over the idea, there
was double taxation in its most virulent form when, as part of a plan
of liquidation, a corporation sold property at a gain and distributed the
proceeds to its shareholders."' Code section 337 provided a route for
avoiding the corporation's tax on such a transaction.42 To the selfstyled advocates of tax equity, this was not the creation of a new exemption, but merely a reduction in tax to a more desirable level.
It is this interpretation of section 337 that is implicit in the McDonald case and other decisions, and permits the courts in the face of
the facts to tell us that gain that can never be taxed is not tax exempt.
Here the appeal is not in the taxpayer's beaux yeux but in the ideology
his cause supports. It is just as compelling as the little old lady's anxious
smile-perhaps more so, for men will die for their faiths-and no less
discouraging to the seeker of guiding principles.
Back in 1882, Sir Frederick Pollock published a collection of essays
which included one entitled "The Science of Case Law." 4 Those were
days when men thought science quite as important as they do now and
had a good deal more faith in the ability of science to answer all questions. Sir Frederick was reasonably persuasive in his proof that the
operations of judges and lawyers "have a truly scientific character, and
that English case-law may fairly claim kindred with the inductive
sciences.44
The decisions in the eleven recent tax cases here examined
were based, it is believed, not on science or logic but on emotion.
We found the Tax Court holding that a fictitious corporation must
be treated as a real one because to do otherwise would be to give
aid and comfort to an obvious tax-avoidance device; we found the
Internal Revenue Service refusing to engage in a like process because
its own regulations, rather than the machinations of the taxpayer, had
created the difficulty. The literal wording of a statute was ignored in
the medical expense case because to do otherwise would have added to
the financial burdens of one for whom chivalry decrees protection. In
40. E.g., compare the various statements with respect to the proposed repeal of
the individual dividend exclusion and credit provisions of the Code in Hearings on
the President's 1963 Tax Message Before the House Committee on Ways and Means,
88th Cong., 1st Sess., 51, 1406, 1970 (1963).
41. This problem was made acute but was certainly not created by the decisions
in Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 65 S. Ct. 707 (1945), and United
States v. Cumberland Pub. Serv. Co., 338 U.S. 451, 70 S. Ct. 280 (1950). The enactment of INT. Rv. CODE OP 1954 § 337 was intended only as a remedy for the uncertainties resulting from these cases. S. RtP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 258
(1954) ; H.R. RtP. No. 1337, 83d Cong. 2d Sess. A106 (1954).
42. For a general discussion of the effect and limitations of this provision, see
Note, 76 HARV. L. Rev. 780 (1963).
43. POLLOCK, The Science of Case Law, in

JURISPRUDENCE AND

LtGAL

EsSAYS

169 (Goodhart ed. 1961).
44. Ibid.
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the section 337 liquidation instance, a deduction of what was pretty
clearly nondeductible was allowed because of a commitment to the
slogan, "Down with double taxation." The purity of the taxpayers'
motives, their freedom from designs of tax avoidance, persuaded the
courts to make believe that the taxable dividends of a former trust were
less than they had actually been, and that a tavern partnership was the
same thing as one in the auto supply business. The lack of such purity
turned the loans of the motel investor into stock purchases, but made
a similar alchemy unavailable to the couple who attempted to avail
themselves of community property concepts to increase their nontaxable
foreign income. Let's-pretend was denied for the same reason to the
estate that claimed it had given its make-believe dividend to charity and
the father who wanted dependency deductions on the strength of his
use of his children's earnings. Finally, in the case of the Pennsylvania
intestate we found that judges are like all the rest of us when we look at
government: it is so big, so impersonal, that we don't mind in the least
45
taking money away from it.

Two conclusions are inescapable. The, first is that the courts
neither follow the law's fictions blindly nor reject them out of hand.
The second is that whether a court or the Service will accept or refuse
to accept a fiction in a particular case depends on the merits of that case
determined in purely subjective terms. Here arguments of law are not
persuasive. The taxpayer who seems to be doing his harried best to
pay what he owes fares better than the one advised by expensive counsel.
If there is an implacable science that dictates such results, its precepts
remain to be formulated.
These conclusions are probably equally valid outside the tax field.
To us who make our living telling others what the courts are going to
do, it may be a little chilling to think that the decisions are actuated by
emotion. But further reflection leads us to suspect that we have always
known this and have unconsciously taken it into account when we made
our predictions. This perhaps is the part of a legal opinion that is
based on nothing more tangible than the feeling in the tips of the
lawyer's fingers.
45. Cf. CAHN, TH4 MoRAL DECISION 171 (1955).
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